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Can you imagine what would happen if any and all cola manu-
facturers could copy the shape of Coca-Cola's traditional classic
cola bottle? How disappointed would you be when you picked up
that fluted glass bottle expecting your old favorite and instead got
an imitation?
The fluted Coca-Cola bottle is an example of the "trade dress"
of a product. Traditionally, trade dress was simply thought of as
labels, wrappers, containers or other packaging.' The notion of
trade dress has expanded over time, and today, the trade dress of
a product is generally defined as "the total image of a product and
may include features such as size, shape, color or color combina-
tions, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques." 2 Thus,
trade dress encompasses the total look of a product and its packaging.3
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Joseph D. Garon, Esq., for his insightful comments and support in writing this Note.
1. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION, § 8.01[2], at 8-5 to 8-8 (3d ed. 1995) (defining trade dress).
2. John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983);
see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §8.01, at 8-1 to 8-12 (defining trade dress in various
circuits and discussing rules of trade dress protection).
Trade dress takes a variety of forms. See, e.g., Computer Care v. Service Sys.
Enters., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992) (infringement on trade dress of auto service re-
minder letters, sales brochure and monthly reports); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 2753, 2755 n. 1 (1992) (infringement on trade dress of restaurant including "the
shape and general appearance of the exterior of the restaurant, the identifying sign, the
interior kitchen floor plan, the decor, the menu, the equipment used to serve food, the
servers' uniforms and other features reflecting on the total image of the restaurant").
3. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.01[2], at 8-5; see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner
Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 80 n.2 (3d. Cir. 1982) ("Although historically trade dress
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To ensure that trade dress does not cause confusion among
products, Congress passed § 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibiting
the "false designation" of a product's origin.4  Section 43(a) re-
quires proving three elements in a trade dress infringement claim:
first, that a consumer is likely to confuse the imitated product's
trade dress with that of its competitor; second, that the imitated
product's trade dress has inherent distinctiveness or has acquired
secondary meaning; and, third, that the imitated trade dress is non-
functional.5 While the various federal circuits agree that the party
claiming trade dress infringement is responsible for proving the
first two elements in federal trade dress infringement claims, the
circuit courts are divided as to whether the plaintiff or the defen-
dant bears the burden of proving or disproving functionality where
the product's trade dress is unregistered.6
This Note examines which party should bear the burden of
proving or disproving functionality in an unregistered trade dress
infringement claim. Part I reviews the legislative history of the
Lanham Act, providing an overview of trade dress infringement
and explaining functionality. Part II surveys representative opin-
ions of the circuit courts and their rationales for placing the burden
on either the plaintiff or defendant. Part III argues that the defen-
dant should always bear the burden of proving functionality in a
trade dress infringement claim. Finally, this Note concludes that
functionality should be an affirmative defense to a trade dress in-
fringement claim, regardless of whether trade dress is registered or
unregistered.
infringement consisted of copying a product's packaging, .... 'trade dress' in its more
modern sense [may] refer to the appearance of the [product] itself.... ).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994); see S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 1333]; see also infra note 8 (citing text of the Lanham Act).
5. See infra note 8 (citing text of the Lanham Act); Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758
(citing § 43(a) of the Lanham Act); infra part I (discussing in depth the elements of the
trade dress infringement claim).
6. Compare, e.g., Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1506 (9th Cir.
1987) (requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden) and Woodsmith Publishing Co. v.
Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (same) with Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring the defendant to bear burden of
proof) and W.T. Rogers Co. V. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
[Vol. 6:345
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I. OVERVIEW OF TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT: §43(a)
OF THE LANHAM ACT, TRADE DRESS INFRINGEMENT AND
FUNCTIONALITY
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides remedies 7 for a vari-
ety of deceptive trade practices,8 including a federal cause of action
for trade dress infringement. 9 The legislative history of § 43(a) and
the case law indicate that the purpose of protecting trademarks and
trade dress functioning as a trademark'" is twofold: first, to ensure
the consumer receives the product it asked for and expected; and,
second, to protect the investment of the trademark owner who has
7. Remedies for trademark/trade dress infringement include: preliminary and perma-
nent injunctions, monetary recovery, punitive damages and attorney fees. See generally
4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30.01-.31, at 30-1 to 30-160.
8. Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1505 (discussing § 43(a) providing a remedy for deceptive
trade practices) (citing Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841
.(9th Cir. 1987)). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in pertinent that:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
9. See Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 803 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) ("It is well established that this section creates a federal cause of action for
trade dress infringement."); see also LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75
(2d Cir. 1985) ("Section 43(a) . . . establishes a federal law of unfair competition by
providing a statutory remedy to a party injured by a competitor's 'false designation of
origin' of its product, whether or not the aggrieved party has a federally registered trade-
mark.").
10. Trademarks are referred to as "trademarks" or "marks" and trade dress is referred
to as "trade dress" or "dress." See, e.g., Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863,
868-69 (8th Cir. 1994).
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spent time, money, and energy bringing a product to the public."
Trademarks protect their owners against another manufacturer's
selling of a product as the trademark owner's.1 2  Because trade-
marks identify a product's manufacturer, consumers rely on trade-
marks when purchasing goods. 13 Trademark protection, and there-
fore, trade dress protection 4 essentially safeguard against unfair
competition.' 5 Trademarks protect the public from deception, pro-
mote fair competition, and secure the advantages of relutation for
the business community.'
6
Under § 43(a)'s protection, a product's manufacturer can regis-
ter its trade dress as a trademark, 7 or protect its product's trade
dress as an unregistered trademark. 8 The difference between regis-
11. S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 4, at 3; see also Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.
v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) ("The core concepts of trademark
protection are that consumers not be confused, misled, or deceived as to whose product
they are buying, that sellers' goodwill---or investment in their reputation for quality-be
protected ...."); LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 (purpose of Lanham Act is to protect con-
sumer from confusion); Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of Functional Features:
Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
77, 92 (1982) ("[The [Lanham] Act's complementary purposes [are] to protect the public
against deception and to prevent diversion of trade through misrepresentation or appropri-
ation of another's goodwill.").
12. S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 4, at 3.
13. Id.
14. See Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir.
1987) ("The issues discussed [in trademark and trade dress cases include] 'secondary
meaning' and 'functionality' [and] have the same meaning in both areas; courts deciding
'trade dress' cases cite freely from 'trademark' cases, and vice versa."); see also
Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 868 ("The difference between trade dress and trademark is no
longer of importance in determining whether trade dress is protected by federal law.").
15. S. REP. NO. 1333, supra note 4, at 4.
16. Id. Once a manufacturer secures a trademark in the trade dress of its product,
others are prohibited from copying that trade dress which, in turn, prevents consumers
from confusing the trademarked product with the imitator's product. Thus, the interests
of both consumers and manufacturers are protected. See supra note 11 (discussing goals
of trade dress protection).
17. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1303 (1995) (citing
Coca-Cola as an example of a registered trademark).
18. See, e.g., Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1506 (protecting unregistered trade dress);
LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75 (trade dress "may become an unregistered trademark eligible
for protection under § 43(a)"); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974
(2d Cir. 1987) (stating "the first manufacturer of a product [is entitled] to an unregistered
[Vol. 6:345
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tered and unregistered trademarks or trade dress is that registered
marks or dress are entitled to certain presumptions while unregis-
tered marks or dress are not.' 9 For example, the registration of a
mark creates a rebuttable presumption that the mark is valid and,
therefore, distinctive and nonfunctional. 20 This presumption places
the burden of proving that the registered mark is invalid on the
allegedly infringing party and can place the burden of proving
functionality on the defendant. 2'. Thus, in a trade dress infringe-
ment claim where a party's trade dress was previously registered,
the defendant bears the burden of proving functionality.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc.,22 to prevail on a claim for trade dress infringe-
ment under § 43(a) three elements were required: first, the trade
dress of the two products had to be confusingly similar causing a
"likelihood of confusion"; second, the trade dress must have ac-
quired "secondary meaning"; and, third, the copied features of the
trade dress had to be primarily nonfunctional.23 In Two Pesos, the
Supreme Court, analogizing trade dress to trademark, extended the
second element of this test to include all trade dress that is "inher-
ently distinctive" as well as trade dress that has acquired secondary
meaning.24
The "likelihood of confusion" element requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant's product and package is sufficiently simi-
lar to its own product and package to confuse ordinary consum-
trademark in the 'trade dress' of its product") (citations omitted).
19. Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 868-69.
20. Id.
21. See id.; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note.l, § 7.26[3][d], at 7-128 (stating that
if the plaintiff has a federally registered trademark, the burden of proving functionality
is on the defendant because a registration is prima facie evidence of validity).
22. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
23. John H. Harland, Co., 711 F.2d at 980; accord, Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young
Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 772-73 (9th Cir. 1981); SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs.,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536
F.2d 1210, 1217-21 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
24. Id. at 2758 (affirming the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs trade dress
involving the appearance, design and motif of its restaurant was inherently distinctive
without having acquired secondary meaning).
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ers.2 5  For example, in Computer Care v. Service Systems Enter-
prises,26 the court found that defendants "slavishly" imitated the
plaintiffs trade dress of auto service reminder letters, sales bro-
chure and monthly reports, thus causing a likelihood of confusion."
The requirement of proving "inherent distinctiveness," or "in-
herent distinctiveness through secondary meaning," requires an
examination of traditional trademark classifications. This is be-
cause trademarks are often classified in categories of increasing
distinctiveness as: "(1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4)
arbitrary; or (5) fanciful. 28 Marks that are "suggestive," "arbi-
trary" or "fanciful" immediately identify a particular source or
manufacturer of a product and are "deemed inherently distinc-
tive. '29 "Merely descriptive" marks are not inherently distinctive
because they do not necessarily identify a particular, though possi-
bly anonymous, 30 source and should be considered free for all to
use.3' However, a "descriptive" mark or dress may acquire distinc-
tiveness in the course of commerce, thereby acquiring "secondary
meaning.' '32 Acquiring "secondary meaning" indicates a mark or
dress has achieved "consumer recognition. 33 This means consum-
ers associate that mark or dress with one particular source or manu-
25. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note I, § 8.03, at 8-18.3; accord First Brands Corp. v. Fred
Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1987).
26. 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992).
27. Id. at 1069-70 (examining all the evidence including deliberate copying to deter-
mine the issue of likelihood of confusion); see Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287
F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961) (explaining the eight factors
involved in determining likelihood of confusion).
28. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
29. Id.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
31. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
32. Id.
33. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.26[2], at 7-116.2; see also Two Pesos, 112 S.
Ct. at 2758-59 (referring to secondary meaning as "substantial consumer association"
(quoting Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 n.7 (5th Cir.
1991))); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 334 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding




facturer.34 Consequently, the second element of a trade dress in-
fringement claim requires a showing that the imitated trademark or
trade dress is inherently distinctive, or that it has acquired consum-
er recognition through secondary meaning.35
Nonfunctionality, the third element required to prevail on a
claim for trade dress infringement under § 43(a), is based on
whether the shape or feature being evaluated has a utilitarian pur-
pose.3 6 If the shape or feature adds utility or quality to the product,
or makes the product more economical to manufacture, then the
shape or feature is "functional," and not protectable.3 7 The ratio-
nale behind functionality is that an indefinite removal from the
realm of competition of a feature that is "essential to the use or
purpose of the article" severely and unjustly disadvantages other
manufacturers.3a Some examples of functional features include:
the oval shape of a football39 the pillow shape of a shredded wheat
biscuit4° and the ribbed outline of a packet for salt and pepper.4
One example of trade dress that was found nonfunctional is the box
and bottle of Chanel No. 5 perfume.42 Additionally, the Supreme
Court has recently held that in certain situations color, by itself,
may be considered a nonfunctional feature, and can therefore serve
as a trademark.43
34. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.02[1], at 8-12 to 8-13, § 8.02[3], at 8-16 to 8-
18; Warner Bros., 724 F.2d at 332; see also Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758-59; Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.II (1982) (noting that the trade dress
of a product attains "secondary meaning" when the consumer associates that trade dress
with a particular producer or source rather than with the product itself).
35. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.02[3], at 8-16 to 8-18; see also Two Pesos, 112
S. Ct. at 2761 (discussing that if trade dress is inherently distinctive, proof of secondary
meaning is not required).
36. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.26[1], at 7-114.
37. Id.; see also Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10 (defining functionality as a
feature that "is essential to the use or purpose of the article or affects the cost or quality
of the article").
38. Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10.
39. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
41. See In re Diamond Crystal Salt-Co., 161 U.S.P.Q. 502 (1969).
42. See Chanel Inc. v. Suttner, 109 U.S.P.Q. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see also I MC-
CARTHY, supra note 1, § 8.03, at 8-20.4 to 8-21.
43. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303-04. See generally, Daniel R. Schechter, Com-
19951
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The functionality element of the 'test for trade dress infringe-
ment is frequently litigated because it demonstrates the conflict
between trademark protection and copyright or patent protection.
The primary rationale for trademark protection is that if competi-
tors could freely copy identifying features, consumers would be
confused as to the source or the manufacturer of the product.
44
Accordingly, trademark protection allows consumers to easily iden-
tify products with which they have had a good experience and want
to continue purchasing, or a bad experience and want to avoid
purchasing.45 However, allowing trademark/trade dress protection
creates conflict because "there exists a fundamental right to com-
pete through imitation of a competitor's product, which right can
only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws.
46
Thus, the concept of functionality removes certain design features
from the realm of trademark protection, limiting the features pro-
tected in a trade dress infringement claim to those found to be
nonfunctional.47 In other words, manufacturers have the right to
use the functional features of a competitor's product and freely
build upon those features, but may not copy nonfunctional, identi-
fying features. However, not all potentially functional features are
automatically excluded from protection. 48 For example, if a fea-
ture, such as color, serves a nonfunctional identifying purpose for
a particular product, it may receive trademark protection.49
ment, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., Inc.: The Supreme Court "Goes for the Gold"
and Allows Trademark Protection for Color Per Se, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 481 (1995).
44. See Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338 (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citations
omitted); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding that
federal patent and copyright law preempts state unfair competition law); Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (same); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding that states may not give protection similar
to a federal patent protection where federal law would not protect the creation).
47. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338. A registered trademark is entitled to the presumption
that the mark is valid, and therefore, nonfunctional, however, the presumption is rebutta-
ble. Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 1994).
48. See Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (holding that although color may be a functional
feature, it may also serve as a trademark if its purpose is a nonfunctional identifying one).
49. Id. at 1306.
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II. CiRcurr COURT DECISIONS
A survey of representative circuit court decisions reveals that
a split exists among the federal circuits regarding which party bears
the burden of proving or disproving functionality in a trade dress
infringement claim where the product's trade dress was unregis-
tered.50 While the Second and Seventh Circuits place the burden
of proof on the defendant, the Ninth, Eighth, and Third Circuits
place the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
A. Burden of Proof on the Defendant
1. Second Circuit
In 1981, the Second Circuit, in Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body
Boutique, Inc.,51 suggested that the burden of proving
nonfunctionality for a § 43(a) claim should rest with the plaintiff.52
However, the court found it unnecessary to decide the issue be-
cause the plaintiff failed to prove its product's appearance or meth-
ods of advertising had acquired secondary meaning, another part of
the pre-Two Pesos three-prong test.
53
The Second Circuit revisited the issue two years 'later. In
Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,54 the Second Circuit af-
firmed summary judgment for the plaintiff on its claim that the
defendant had violated § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 55 The plaintiff
claimed that the defendant marketed a toy car which closely resem-
bled the "General Lee," an automobile featured in the plaintiff's
television series "The Dukes of Hazard. 56 The plaintiff further
claimed that the similarity confused consumers as to whether the
50. In addition to those circuits discussed herein, the First Circuit addressed the issue
of which party must bear the burden of proving or disproving functionality in a trade
dress infringement claim, expressed uncertainty as to whether this burden rests with the
plaintiff or defendant, and has not resolved the issue. See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All
Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195-96 (1st Cir. 1980).
51. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
52. id. at 304.
53. id.
54. 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 329.
56. Id.
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plaintiff manufactured the toy.57 The only difference between the
defendant's car and the real General Lee was that the symbol on
the side of the defendant's car was a "10" instead of the "01"
which appeared on the plaintiff's car.58 When customers noted the
apparent error and complained, the defendant sent them individual
labels of a "1" and a "0," telling them to affix the numbers as they
saw fit.
59
In finding for the plaintiff, the Second Circuit characterized the
question of functionality as a defense, thus placing the burden of
proving functionality on the defendant. 6° In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court stated that the functionality defense was developed
for three reasons: (1) to prevent the monopolization of useful de-
sign features; (2) to promote competition; and (3) to encourage
broad dissemination of those features.6'
The Second Circuit followed its Warner reasoning two years
later in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.62  In LeSportsac, the
plaintiff sued the defendant to enjoin the defendant's marketing of
canvas bags whose trademark and trade dress the district court
57. Id.
58. Id. at 329 n.1.
59. Id. The district court found that the plaintiff had a right to a monopoly over the
profits generated from a demand for "General Lee" copies which was created because of
the success of the "Dukes of Hazard" television show. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys,
Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
60. Warner, 724 F.2d at 331.
61. Id.; see also Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F.
979, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1911), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 730 (1912).
Development in a useful art is ordinarily toward effectiveness of operation
and simplicity of form. Carriages, bicycles, automobiles, and many other things
from diversity have approached uniformity through the utilitarian impulse. If
one manufacturer should make an advance in effectiveness of operation, or in
simplicity of form, or in utility of color; and if that advance did not entitle him
to a monopoly by means of a machine or a process or a product or a design
patent; and if by means of unfair trade suits he could shut out other manufactur-
ers who plainly intended to share in the benefits of the unpatented utilities ..
. he would be given gratuitously a monopoly more effective than that of the
unobtainable patent in the ratio of eternity to 17 years.
Id. at 981-82.
62. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
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found to be confusingly similar to that of the plaintiff's product.63
Citing Warner, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision and characterized functionality as a defense, thus, placing
the burden of proving functionality on the defendant. 6' The
LeSportsac court stated that "[r]equiring the plaintiff to prove
nonfunctionality... might 'defeat [] the Lanham Act's purpose of
enabling a purchaser to distinguish one product from another...
because a plaintiff unable to prove that the features copied are
nonfunctional will not prevail, no matter how compelling the evi-
dence that purchasers are confused .... ,,,6' LeSportsac also relied
on Justice White's concurring opinion in Inwood Laboratories, Inc.
v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,66 which asserted that "functionality is a
defense to a suit under § 43(a) of Lanham Act."67
2. Seventh Circuit
a. W. T. Rogers Co. v. Keene
In 1985, the same year the Second Circuit decided Lesportsac,
the Seventh Circuit, in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene,68 likewise held
that functionality is an affirmative defense to a § 43(a) trade dress
infringement claim. 69 In Rogers, the plaintiff and defendant were
63. Id. at 73.
64. Id. at 76.
65. Id. (quoting Litman, supra note 11, at 87 n.78 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333, supra
note 4, at 4)).
66. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
67. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 (citing Inwood Labs. 456 U.S. at 863 (White, J.,
concurring)). Inwood Labs. involved a drug manufacturer who claimed that generic drug
companies were vicariously liable for pharmacists' infringement of its product's trade-
mark. Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 849-50. The generic companies copied the drug's
appearance resulting in pharmacists dispensing the generic drug as the name-brand drug.
Id. at 850. The district court did not hold the generic drug companies liable because there
was no showing that these companies induced the pharmacists to infringe on the trade-
mark by dispensing the generic as the name-brand drug, nor was there a showing that
these companies knew the pharmacists were mislabeling the generic product yet continued
to supply them nonetheless. Id. at 855. However, Justice White explained that the use
of a product or package design so similar to that of another manufacturer is likely to
confuse consumers as to the product's source and may constitute "false designation of
origin" within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Id. at 863 (White, J., concurring).
68. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 338.
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competing manufacturers of office supplies. The plaintiff's claim
arose over the defendant's copying of a "molded plastic stacking
office tray [used] for letters and other documents. '70  The defen-
dant's tray was almost identical to the plaintiff's tray.7' The plain-
tiff had never attempted to obtain a design patent for its tray, nor
had it ever tried to register the unique end panels of its tray as a
trademark.72
In Rogers, the court accepted the functionality defense doctrine,
stating that "functionality is a traditional defense in the common
law of unfair competition to a suit for trademark infringement., 73
The court explained that there are two views regarding the interpre-
tation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.74 The first view is that the
section provides a federal remedy for unfair competition (occurring
in interstate commerce), and thus requires a court to look to a
state's common law for the "contours of the functionality de-
fense., 75 The second view is that § 43(a) creates a "federal sub-
stantive law of unfair competition in interstate commerce, or more
precisely authorizes the federal courts to create such a law. 76 In
other words, federal courts are given the power to create federal
common law.77 Under the latter view, an infringement claim is a
suit to enforce a federal common law trademark and would not
require the court to follow a state's common law.78 Under federal
common law, the court may or may not be bound to recognize a
defense of functionality, and nonfunctional features may not be
protectable unless competition is "unduly hindered" by copying
those nonfunctional features.79
70. Id. at 337.
.71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.26[3][d], at
7-126 to 7-127 ('The majority takes the view that functionality is a classic 'defense' to
be pleaded and proven by the defendant as.part of a challenge to validity.").





79. See id. (citing Litman, supra note 11, at 81-93). This is problematic because a
federal common law for trade dress infringement could be arbitrarily determined by the
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The Seventh Circuit explained that this second view ignores the
"importance of recognizing a defense of functionality in order to
head off a collision between Section 43(a) and patent law."80 Pre-
venting a collision is important because patent law fosters competi-
tion among manufacturers by allowing patented subject matter to
enter the public domain after seventeen years.81 If federal common
law were to allow indefinite trademark protection for functional
features, it would thwart patent law's goal of limiting the time
period a functional feature can remain out of the public realm and
therefore interfere with the primary purpose of patent law.82
The Rogers court also noted a practical objection to the federal
common law view, referring to problems with enforcing federal
common law.83 The court claimed that "confusion, complexity, and
forum-shopping would be the result of allowing firms to enforce
simultaneously, in different courts, state and federal common law
trademarks. 84 While the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly decide
whether the common law trademark that § 43(a) protects is state or
federal, the court strongly favored functionality as an affirmative
defense requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving func-
federal courts. It could allow copying of nonfunctional features which would increase
consumer confusion and thereby undermine trademark law's goal of protecting the con-
sumer from confusion amongst products. Id.
80. Id.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co.,
963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1992); see also In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332,
1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining that the fundamental right to compete may only be
temporarily denied).
82. Merchant, 963 F.2d at 633.
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent
becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.
It follows, as a matter of course, that on the termination of the patent there
passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was
constructed during the patent.
Id. (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)); see also Pope
Automatic Merchandising, 191 F. at 981-82 (explaining it is unfair to allow a manufactur-
er a gratuitous monopoly more effective than a patent "in the ratio of eternity to 17
years").
83. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338.
84. Id.
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tionality to rebut a trade dress infringement claim.
b. Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises
More recently, the Seventh Circuit in Computer Care86 advocat-
ed the current Two Pesos87 modification to the traditional three-
prong test for proving trade dress infringement.88 In Computer
Care, the court explained that the elements of a trade dress in-
fringement claim are that: (1) the trade dress is "inherently distinc-
tive" or has acquired "secondary meaning"; (2) the similarity be-
tween the defendant's and the plaintiff's trade dress creates a "like-
lihood'of confusion"; and (3) the plaintiff's trade dress is "nonfunc-
tional. 89 Clarifying its view, the court stated that functionality "is
actually an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the
burden of proof."90
B. Burden of Proof on the Plaintiff
1. Ninth Circuit
In contrast to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc. ,91 placed the burden of
proof on the plaintiff,92 despite the court's acknowledgement that
85. Id.
86. 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992).
87. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
88. Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1067; see also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicy-
cles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that in a trade dress infringement
case, a manufacturer must prove its trade dress has acquired secondary meaning or that
it is inherently distinctive).
89. Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1067-68 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added); see also Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971
F.2d 6, 20 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating functionality is actually an affirmative defense). In
Computer Care, both the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged in the auto service
"reminder letter" business. Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1065. Each used a computer
program to generate letters on behalf of auto dealerships and repair shops reminding car
owners when it was time to bring their cars in for service. Id. The plaintiff brought suit
claiming the defendant infringed upon its trade dress of reminder letters, sales brochure
and monthly reports. Id. The district court found that the presentation and format of the
plaintiff's trade dress could be varied and did not have to be set up in a specific way to
perform its function. Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 761 F. Supp. 1333, 1335
(N.D. Ill. 1991). Therefore, the plaintiff's trade dress was found nonfunctional. Id. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the issue of functionality. Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1071.
91. 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1506 (citing First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d
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the "weight of authority" characterizes functionality as a defense.93
The Rachel court, therefore, required the plaintiff to prove
nonfunctionality as an element of its cause of action.94 However,
the court gave little reason for its decision.95
In Rachel, the plaintiff sold synthetic animal heads to the defen-
dant, Banana Republic, for display in its retail stores. 96  Banana
Republic later terminated its business with Rachel and began pur-
chasing animal displays from Fred Funk, who improved on Ra-
chel's work by casting a mold of an actual specimen to add realism
to the animal display.97 Rachel brought suit claiming trade dress
infringement and arguing that the defendants bore the burden of
proving functionality.98 The Rachel court, relying on Ninth Circuit
precedent, held that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
nonfunctionality 99 Therefore, under Ninth Circuit analysis, proving
nonfunctionality is an essential element of a plaintiff's cause of
action. l°° Rachel subsequently lost his claim because he failed to
fulfill this burden. 10 1
1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987)). The First Brands decision stated,without any extensive
analysis, that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof as an element of its cause of action.
The court stated the "[Plaintiff] must prove that its trade dress: (1) is nonfunctional, (2)
has acquired secondary meaning, and (3) is likely to be confused with [the defendant's]
private label .... " First Brands, 809 F.2d at 1381.
93. Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1506 n.2. But see LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75-76 (opining
that the defendant has the burden of proving functionality); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam
Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that functionality is a defense);
Stormy Clime, 809 F.2d at 974 (stating that the defendant can show functionality to
prevail); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:26 [3][d], at 7-127 (placing the burden of
proving functionality on the defendant once the plaintiff has shown inherent distinctive-
ness).
94. Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1506.
95. Id. The Rachel court only stated that "[i]n [the Ninth Circuit] we have placed
the burden of proof on the plaintiff." Id. The court gave no further explanation, except
to acknowledge in a footnote the current controversy as to whether the plaintiff or defen-
dant should bear the burden of proving or disproving functionality. Id. at n.2.
96. Id. at 1506.
97. Id. at 1505.
98. Id. at 1506.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
101. Id. at 1506-07.
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2. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit, in Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith
Corp.,10 2 similarly held that the burden of proving nonfunctionality
rested with the plaintiff.0 3 In Woodsmith, both parties "published
nationally competing bimonthly magazines for the woodworking
hobbyist and used advertising mailers to solicit subscriptions."' 4
The plaintiff sued, alleging trade dress infringement.' 5 The plain-
tiff claimed the defendant assumed its trade dress and engaged in
unfair competition by using a subscription solicitation system con-
fusingly similar to the plaintiffs system."°  The district court
granted the defendant's request for summary judgment' 7 which the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Woodsmith court stated "[a] moving
party is 'entitled to judgment as a matter of law' if the nonmoving
party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of
a claim with respect to which it has the burden of proof."' 0 8 Thus,
the court concluded that proving nonfunctionality is an "essential
element" of a plaintiffs cause of action, and therefore, a plaintiff
must bear' the burden of proof in order to succeed on its claim. "o
However, the Eighth Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, gave no further
explanation for its conclusion requiring the plaintiff to bear the
burden of proof in a trade dress infringement claim.
3. Third Circuit
Like the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit requires
a plaintiff claiming trade dress infringement to prove: "(1) that the
imitated feature is non-functional, (2) that the imitated feature has
acquired a 'secondary meaning,' and (3) that consumers are likely
to confuse the source of the plaintiff's product with that of the
102. 904 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990).
103. See id. at 1247.
104. 1d. at 1245.
105. Id. at 1246.
106. Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1246 (8th Cir.
1990).
107. Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1651 (BNA) (S.D.
Iowa 1989).
108. Woodsmith, 904 F.2d at 1247 (quoting in part, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477




defendant's product." 110 In Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt
Building Products Co.,111 the Third Circuit asserted that the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving nonfunctionality in a trade dress
infringement claim." 2 The plaintiff brought the action as a result
of defendant's copying of the plaintiff's "long-length, concealed
fastener metal roofing system."' 3 This design became known as
the "bulb & hook" configuration." 4 The plaintiff patented both the
standing seam roofing product and the special zippering tool used
in the system. 5 However, the patents expired in April 1984.16
The plaintiff then marketed its product under the registered trade-
mark of "Zip-Rib."'" 7 The district court held the "bulb & hook"
profile of the Zip-Rib product was trade dress and protectable un-
der § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.118
The Third Circuit, applying the pre-Two Pesos three-prong test
for trade dress infringement, vacated and remanded the district
court's decision, holding that the plaintiff failed to make the requi-
site showing of nonfunctionality." 9 Thus, the Third Circuit adopt-
ed the rule that the plaintiff must prove nonfunctionality as an
essential element of its cause of action, but did not explain in detail
the rationale for doing so120
110. Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633 (3d
Cir. 1992).
111. 963 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1992).
112. Id. at 633. "This court places the burden on the plaintiff to prove non-function-
ality." Id. (citing American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136,
1141 (3d Cir. 1986)).
113. Id. at 631.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 632 n.2.
1,17. Id. at 631.
118. See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1467,
1482 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
119. Merchant, 963 F.2d at 635-36.
120. Id. at 633.
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III. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROVING
FUNCTIONALITY IN A TRADE DREsS INFRINGEMENT CLAIM
Upon consideration of the various competing viewpoints, func-
tionality should be a federal affirmative defense in a trade dress
infringement claim because it is the most persuasive and best sup-
ported solution to the conflict among the circuits.
The Seventh Circuit's analysis and the Lanham Act's legislative
history demonstrate that the aim of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act is
to prevent confusion of consumers and allow them to purchase
products they have experienced and enjoyed, while avoiding prod-
ucts they have previously experienced and disliked.' Accordingly
functionality should be an affirmative defense. This is for several
reasons. First, nonfunctionality as a negative assertion is difficult
to prove.'22 If proving nonfunctionality is required and a plaintiff
fails to prove nonfunctionality, that plaintiff cannot prevail on a
trade dress infringement claim. If the plaintiff does not prevail, the
defendant may continue to market a confusingly similar product
and consumers will remain uncertain of the source or manufacturer
of the product they wish to buy. 23 Because the main goal of the
Lanham Act is to prevent consumer confusion, its primary purpose
may be defeated when a plaintiff bears the burden of proof and
fails to carry its burden. 12
4
A second reason why functionality should be an affirmative
defense is to prevent a collision between § 43(a) and patent law. 25
121. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338; see supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the purpose of the Lanham Act).
122. See 78 A.L.R. FED 712, § 2(d), at 718 (discussing the fine line between func-
tional and nonfunctional features illustrated by the conflicting opinions of the courts in
deciding where that line should be drawn); see also Richard A. Epstein, Pleading and
Presumption, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 573-578 (1973) (advocating the allocation of
burden to the party with the affirmative side); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2486 (3d ed. 1940) ("[i]t is often
said that the burden is upon the party having in form the affirmative allegation").
123. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76 (citing Litman, supra note 11, at 87 n.78).
124. Id.; see also supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
of the Lanham Act).
125. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the potential collision
between patent law and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note
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A federal common law that would not require either party to prove
functionality or would only protect nonfunctional features if com-
petition was "unduly hindered" by the copying of those features
would create a conflict with patent limitations. 126 Patent law essen-
tially creates a limited monopoly, 127 limiting the amount of time a
design or product may be protected from copying in order to pro-
mote competition and development. 28  Thus, allowing indefinite
protection of functional trade dress which could otherwise be cop-
ied and improved upon, would directly undermine the purpose of
patent limitations. Although the importance of the concept of func-
tionality is not disputed, preventing a conflict between two federal
laws, patent law and the Lanham Act, strongly supports the use of
the uniform defense of functionality.
A third reason for functionality as an affirmative defense in-
volves the concept of fairness. The law should favor a plaintiff
who has allegedly suffered injury to its economic status, its reputa-
tion, or both, because of the acts of the infringing party. 129 This is
especially true because the plaintiff must already bear the difficult
1, § 7.26[1], at 7-114 (explaining that an important policy supporting the functionality
doctrine is to prevent a collision between trademark and patent law).
126. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (noting the problems created by the
conflict between patent law and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act). See generally 1 MCCAR-
THY, supra note 1, § 7.26[1], at 7-114 (noting that if a manufacturer could shut out others
from use of an unpatented utility, he would be getting a gratuitous monopoly).
127. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the collision between
patent law and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act).
128. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
129. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 432 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992) (indicating fairness is an important factor in allocating the burden of proof).
[T]here is no key principle governing the apportionment of the burdens of
proof. Their allocation, either initially or ultimately, will depend upon the
weight that is given to any one or more of several factors, including: (1) the
natural tendency to place burdens on the party desiring change, (2) special
policy considerations such as those disfavoring certain defenses, (3) conve-
nience, (4) fairness, and (5)the judicial estimate of the probabilities.
Id. (emphasis added); see also WIGMORE, supra note 122, § 2486 (explaining there is no
universal rule for determining the burden of proof, but the ultimate basis of the determina-
tion rests upon "broad reasons of experience and fairness") (emphasis added); Epstein,
supra note 122, at 579-80 (advocating the use of the fairness test in allocating the burden
of proof).
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burden of proving another stringent element of the trade dress in-
fringement test: inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning. 130
The concept of fairness also supports requiring the defendant to
prove a "positive" assertion through an affirmative defense of func-
tionality, instead of requiring a plaintiff to fulfill the arduous task
of proving a "negative" assertion, nonfunctionality.1
31
Finally, Supreme Court Justice White in his concurrence in
Inwood Laboratories endorsed the view that the defendant must
bear the burden of proof. 32 Justice White's opinion strengthens the
claim that functionality is an affirmative defense, because lower
courts have received little guidance otherwise from the Supreme
Court on the issue of who bears the burden of proof in a trade
dress infringement claim.
On the other hand, the strongest argument advanced by the
circuits which favor the plaintiff bearing the burden of proving
nonfunctionality is that nonfunctionality is an essential element of
the plaintiffs cause of action and, therefore, the burden of proving
it should be borne by the plaintiff.133 Initially, this argument seems
extremely rudimentary. Despite its simplicity, requiring the plain-
tiff to prove all the elements of a cause of action is a basic premise
to succeeding on a claim and is a difficult premise to ignore.
1 34
Additionally, one can argue that a plaintiff has a "peculiar
means of knowledge" about its product which enables them to
130. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:26 [3][d], at 7-127 (placing the burden of
proving functionality on the defendant once the plaintiff has shown inherent distinctive-
ness).
131. See supra note 122 (discussing the allocation of the burden of proof to parties
with the affirmative side).
132. See Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (stating that
the defendant has the burden of proving functionality).
133. See discussion supra part II.B (discussing the arguments for placing the burden
of proving nonfunctionality on the plaintiff); cf. WIGMORE, supra note 122, § 2486 ("It
is sometimes said that [the burden of proof] is upon the party to whose case the fact is
essential.").
134. See Trico Prods. Corp. v. Ace Prods. Corp., 30 F.2d 688, 689 (D. Conn. 1929)
(implying that before a case of unfair competition is made out, a plaintiff must prove
defendant copied more than simply functional features).
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more easily meet the burden of proving nonfunctionality. 135 There-
fore, if a plaintiff can more easily fulfill the burden of proof, the
plaintiff should bear that burden and prove nonfunctionality.
Finally, if one argues that the main purposes of the functional-
ity defense is to prevent useful features of a product from being
monopolized and to encourage competition, 136 requiring the plaintiff
to bear the burden of proving nonfunctionality can support these
goals equally as well. Proving or disproving functionality can be
a difficult task. Placing the burden of proof with the plaintiff may
indirectly favor the defendant because the plaintiff will be more
likely to fail in an attempt to prove trade dress infringement. Con-
sequently, if a plaintiff cannot prove trade dress infringement, the
defendant can continue using those similar features which, in turn,
prevents their monopolization and encourages competition. There-
fore, arguing that the goal of encouraging competition and protect-
ing functional features from monopolization favors an affirmative
defense is not strongly persuasive.
13 7
135. See WIGMORE, supra note 122, § 2486.
136. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983).
137. Another view proposes that traditional state common law for unfair competition
should determine whether functionality is a defense to a § 43(a) trade dress infringement
claim. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338; see also supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text
(regarding functionality as a traditional state common law defense to unfair competition).
This reasoning has weight in light of the potential problems involved with creating a
federal common law to govern trade dress claims. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 338. A federal
common law that diverges from a state's common law could result in different outcomes
depending on whether a suit was brought in federal or state court or could simply not
recognize functionality at all. Id. The fear is that implementing a federal common law
could lead to confusion, complexity and forum shopping problems due to the potential for
conflicting outcomes. Id. Favoring simplicity and insuring that the outcome of a trade
dress infringement claim will not change if brought in federal as opposed to state court,
argues for following a state's traditional common law and against creating a federal
common law.
However, the downside to following each individual state's common law is that it
will still present the possibility of forum shopping among the individual states, defeating
the initial goals of uniformity and simplicity. Additionally, functionality as a defense
does not cause conflicts with patent limitations because it is still a requirement in a trade
dress infringement claim and functional features will not be afforded trademark protection.
Finally, the legislative history suggests that trademark and trade dress protection should
be covered by federal and not state substantive law:
There can be no doubt under the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the
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However, none of these arguments for requiring the plaintiff to
bear the burden are truly compelling. 13  First, the circuits that re-
quire the plaintiff to bear the burden of proof do not explain their
reasoning in great detail. Because these courts have not fully ex-
plained their reasoning or adequately addressed the concerns of the
circuits that place the burden of proof on the defendant, their posi-
tion is weakened. Second, a plaintiff seeking to protect nonfunc-
tional trade dress is afforded protection under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act 139 and should not be subject to greater chance of fail-
ure on its claim in order to encourage competition. Third, consum-
ers who are already confused as to a product's manufacturer will
remain confused if a plaintiff is required to bear the burden of
proving nonfunctionality and fails. Considering these factors, along
with all the competing arguments that favor the defendant bearing
the burden of proof-the legislative history of § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 140 resolving conflicts with patent limitations,' 4' fair-
ness to all parties, 142 uniformity, and simplicity' 43 -the weight of
the arguments overwhelmingly favors the defendant bearing the
burden of proving functionality in a § 43(a) trade dress infringe-
ment claim.
constitutionality of a national act giving substantive as distinguished from mere-
ly procedural rights in trade-marks in commerce over which Congress has
plenary power, and when it is considered that the protection of trade-marks is
merely protection to goodwill, to prevent diversion of trade through misrepre-
sentation, and the protection of the public against deception, a sound public
policy requires that trade-marks should receive nationally the greatest protection
that can be given them.
S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 4, at 5. Therefore, establishing functionality as a federal
affirmative defense is a more appropriate option than allowing states to individually
determine the standard for a federal trade dress infringement claim. Moreover, the former
option is supported by the legislative history of the Lanham Act.
138. See discussion supra part II.B (discussing the arguments for placing the burden
of proving nonfunctionality on the plaintiff).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
140. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 80-82, 125 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Having the defendant bear the burden of proving functionality
as an affirmative defense in a § 43(a) trade dress infringement
claim is the best way to protect the interests of consumers who
want to buy "the real thing" when purchasing their Classic Coca-
Cola or any other favored product. Requiring a defendant to prove
functionality as an affirmative defense is the most fair allocation of
burden among the parties. It provides uniformity, simplicity, and
is supported by the legislative history. Furthermore, the burden of
functionality is already presumed to be on the defendant if the
trade dress is registered with the Patent-Trademark Office. Thus,
to avoid future confusion, functionality should be a uniform affir-
mative defense to a claim of trade dress infringement under § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, in all instances, regardless of whether the trade
dress is registered or unregistered.

